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Abstract—Providing security and privacy protection in Radio
Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags is a challenging task due to
their highly constrained resources. Because tags cannot support
strong cryptography, security must rely on low-computational
solutions. Privacy protection is often an additional requirement
for acceptance of the technology by end-users. Thus, dedicated
lightweight algorithms and protocols need to be designed.
In this paper, we propose a set of extremely lightweight
(optionally mutual) authentication protocols between a tag and
a database (sharing a secret value) which protect the identity of
the tag. However, if, for some practical reasons, the identity of
the tag needs to be revealed to the reader, an additional optional
last step can be added at the end of our protocols to satisfy this
requirement. Our proposals are inspired by the protocol of Chien
et al. [1] but they are more efficient, since they operate in O(1)
at database side, whilst covering security flaws and enforcing
privacy protection. We examine the adequacy of our solutions
regarding the chosen security requirements and their strengths
against some well-known and more exotic attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags are small
integrated-chip circuits which usually do not have an internal
battery (power is supplied by a reader through an inductive
coupling). Thus processing time and communication distance
are limited (e.g. a tag could only communicate up to a few
meters) but sufficient for many applications requiring a remote
wireless identification (ID) to identify products, animals, per-
sons, etc. These applications [1, 2] must be designed carefully
in order to ensure security and privacy protection in different
areas like warehouse or library management, fast shopping
checkouts, pets identification, anti-counterfeiting, physical ac-
cess control (e.g. to buildings or public transport systems),
logical access control (e.g. to online application or content),
etc.
As depicted in figure 1, an RFID system is usually com-
posed of a database hosted on a server which is connected
to several readers (for an access control system for public
transport system, there are readers at each entrance). Each
of these readers can read one or several tags at the same
time according its capabilities and the database has to handle
authentications in an efficient way.
Figure 1. Simplified overview of an RFID infrastructure
For a wide market penetration and for economical reasons,
tags are manufactured with low computational and memory
capabilities. Although they are not designed to be truly tamper-
resistant, they provide sufficient levels of protection that re-
quire expensive reverse engineering methods for an attacker to
disclose sensitive information like internal keys. Therefore the
main attack vector is the communication channel. For instance,
an adversary can abuse it in order to obtain some secret
information by performing various attacks like physical layer
analysis [3], eavesdropping [4, 5]. He can also perform more
sophisticated attacks to disrupt communication (e.g. jamming
the channel to disable exchanges between the tag and the rest
of the infrastructure) [6, 7].
A well-know issue of RFID systems, is related to privacy
protection, since each tag is usually associated to a unique
identity that must be protected against disclosure to unautho-
rized entities.
A. Contributions
The salient contributions of this paper are to:
1) Specify a set of protocols which aim to efficiently enforce
privacy protection at reader level for low-cost tags during
an (optionally mutual) authentication process. They are
inspired of the protocol proposed by Chien et al. [1] but
they are more efficient, since the database can operate in
O(1), whilst covering security flaws [8, 9] and enforcing
privacy protection. The main goal of proposing several
protocols is to enable the RFID system issuer to choose
one that better meets any identified requirements.
2) Provide security and performance analysis to demonstrate
that the proposed protocols support both the functional
and security requirements defined in this paper.
B. Structure of the paper
Section II presents the functional requirements of the tar-
geted RFID systems. Then, a threat analysis is performed
and some assumptions are given in section III. Section IV
describes the security requirements for our protocols in order
to protect at reader level the identity of tags whilst keeping
the computational complexity low. The protocols are then
detailed in section V. Section VI provides a security analysis
of protocols to give a rational that security requirements are
satisfied. Finally, section VII provides performance analysis.
Section VIII is dedicated to related work and section IX
provides concluding remarks.
II. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
As aforementioned in the previous section, our proposal is
targeting RFID systems where an end-to-end authentication is
performed by the database in order to ensure privacy protection
at reader level. A database is thus a central element and both
infrastructure and protocol need to support it in an efficient
way. For instance, unambiguous and fast information retrieval
from the database is an essential feature of RFID systems that
the protocol should have to carefully protect. Subsequently we
present the minimal functional requirements for targeted RFID
systems.
A. Efficiency
1) Uniqueness of Tag’s ID: In RFID systems that our
protocols are addressing each tag should have a unique Secure
ID (SID) shared with the database. At enrollment of the tag,
an entry is added in a hash table of database: SID being the
value to store and hkSID the related key to access this value.
2) Authentication Processing Time: In RFID systems, au-
thentication must often be real-time. Indeed the database must
be able to handle multiple authentication tries in the same
time (from several tags through one or several readers). For
instance in a shop, it is not acceptable that authentication of
products takes several seconds, since products are scanned
by multiple cashiers at the same time and customers may
complain if the overall process is not efficient enough. Even
if our authentication protocols are not designed to be used
in “time-critical” environments, the authentication processing
time should have to be limited in order to guarantee efficiency.
a) Fast Information Retrieval and Scalability: To ensure
faster information retrieval than Chien et al.’s protocol [1] and
to support scalability when the population of tags is growing
on the database side, it is required that hkSID should be
stored on the tag.
b) Minimize Exchanged Messages: To ensure efficiency
of communications, our protocols must minimize the number
of messages and the size of the data exchanged on the RF
interface between reader and the tag. Indeed communication
standards on this latter interface are slower than those between
the reader and database. However the number of messages
should be minimized without jeopardizing security.
B. Lightweight
For a wide adoption, our proposals address RFID systems
operating with low-cost tags. Thus our protocols will have to
be in the “lightweight class” of the well established Chien’s
classification of RFID authentication protocols [10]: i.e. pro-
tocol that can only use Random Number Generator (RNG)
and simple functions like a Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC)
checksum, but no hash function.
C. Resilience
Our protocols will have to protect the infrastructure against
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. A stateless-designed proto-
col, i.e. a protocol in which communication partners do not
need to retain session information to ensure a good execution
of the run, would help to support this requirement.
III. THREATS ANALYSIS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The adversary model considered in this paper is stronger
than the Dolev-Yao model [11] since our attacker can perform
timing attacks.
A. Threats
The aim of an attacker is to extract sensitive information
from the protocol or from the communicating entities in
order to break the privacy protection or simply to bypass the
authentication process. The identified threats are listed bellow:
 (T1) An attacker can impersonate one entity: a tag, a
reader or the database.
 (T2) An attacker can eavesdrop the communication.
 (T3) An attacker can inject chosen data.
 (T4) An attacker can disrupt the communication channel.
 (T5) An attacker can retrieve secret information from the
implementation leakages.
 (T6) An attacker can exploit unexpected states in the
design of the protocol.
B. Assumptions
The assumptions for the secure and efficient operation of
our protocol are:
 (A1) The RFID system provider (database owner) is
trusted.
 (A2) The server which hosts the database is secure and
protected.
 (A3) The infrastructure between the server and the read-
ers is trusted both in terms of information protection (e.g.
thank to a Secure Access Module embedded in the readers
that establishes a secure connection with the database) but
also in terms of availability.
 (A4) The tag is tamper-resistant and not tamper-proof.
 (A5) The tag has a good Random Number Generator
(RNG).
 (A6) The tag supports a function named g which is in
the aforementioned lightweight-class and one-way (i.e.
it is not possible to retrieve the input thanks to the
output). We assume that this function is not vulnerable
against timing and algebraic attacks. It can be considered
as a Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG). For
this function, there are several candidates: LAMED [12],
AKARI-X [13], the ring-FCSR Stream Cipher [14, 15],
etc. Since these functions operate on different input and
output sets, we will propose several variants for g, called
g1, g2 and g3.
IV. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
To ensure adequate security and privacy protection of the
SID and hkSID used in the authentication protocols, we
draw the following security requirements. To support them, our
protocols use a key (K) shared by the tags and the database.
A. Authentication
The first requirement is to be able to perform a tag authen-
tication to the database. However, to support more use cases,
we add the requirement that the tag is also able to authenticate
the database.
B. Privacy protection
The second security requirement of our protocols is to
avoid traceability at reader level in order to enforce pri-
vacy protection. During the authentication process with the
database, the communications must not reveal neither the SID
nor hkSID (i.e. they should not be exchanged in plaintext).
Communications must also not reveal if the tag was ever seen
before (i.e. traces of authentication runs for a same tag must
be different at each run). However for specific applications,
our protocols will provide the possibility to reveal the tag
identity to the reader during an optional final step: e.g. when
the reader is fully trusted and some specific operations must
be performed. It must be noted that our protocols do not
ensure anonymity at the database level since the RFID system
provider is considered as a trusted party (see assumption A1).
V. PROTOCOLS
For each of our protocols we provide two variants. The first
version only achieves a tag authentication to the database. The
second version achieves a mutual authentication of the tag
and the database. Since the three protocols follow the same
scheme, we will first present its building blocks and the basic
operations. The main difference between our three protocols
is the sets of input/output over the g function.
A. Notation
Table I introduces the notation used to describe our proto-
cols.
Table I
NOTATION USED IN PROTOCOLS DESCRIPTION.
DB : Denotes a database
R : Denotes a reader
T : Denotes a tag
SID : Denotes a Secure ID of a tag
hkSID : Denotes key of Secure ID of a tag in hash table of database
K : Denotes the key shared by tags and database
R1 : Random number generated by the reader
R2 : Random number generated by the tag
X[i::j] : Denotes the sequence of bits of X from i
th-bit to jth-bit; i > j
A! B : Message sent by an entity A to an entity B
X  Y : Bitwise XOR of data items X , Y
X ^ Y : Bitwise AND of data items X , Y
X  Y : Bitwise left shift on X of Y bits
X  Y : Bitwise right shift on X of Y bits
XjjY : Concatenation of data items X , Y
X = Y : Assign value Y to X
X
?
= Y : Compare equality of X with Y
Query : Message to start the authentication procedure
AuthDB : Authentication ticket from the database
AuthT : Authentication ticket from the tag
OK : Message to acknowledge success of authentication
NOK : Message to acknowledge failure of authentication
B. Definitions
Before providing the details of our proposed protocols,
several functions must be defined.
The g1(X) is the PRNG function:
g1 :
Fl2 ! Fl2
X 7! g1(X) where the resulting value is random:
The g2(X;Y ) is the PRNG function:
g2 :
Fl2  Fl2 ! Fl2
X;Y 7! g2(X;Y ) where the resulting value is random:
The g3(X) is the PRNG function:
g3 :
Fl2 ! F2l2
X 7! g3(X) where the resulting value is random:
Left(X) and Right(X) are two substring functions which
respectively return the half-most and the half-least significant
bits of X .
Left :
F2m2 ! Fm2
X 7! Left(X) = X[2m 1::m]
Right :
F2m2 ! Fm2
X 7! Right(X) = X[m 1::0]
C. The Tag Enrollment Phase
We assume SID, hkSID and K 2 Fl2. The following steps
must be performed by the issuer prior to use the protocols.
 Generate the SID value and the hkSID key (ideally
values and keys are uniformly distributed, i.e. they are not
consecutive) with the property that there is no collision
on SID and hkSID (no identical value as SID and no
identical keys as hkSID).
For instance, a random number in Fl2 is generated by the
server, the database checks that this value is not present
in the values of hash table of the database in O(n). The
hkSID key can be computed with a PRNG function like
g1 applied on the generated SID since its output being
unique, there will be no collision with an already existing
key if there is no collision on SID.
 Send the entry hkSID and SID of the hash table along
with the related secret key K to the tag.
 Put the tag in a ready to use state (i.e. a state in which
it is no longer possible to update hkSID and SID).
 Add in the hash table of the database this entry hkSID,
SID along with additional information about the entity
to which the tag is delivered.
Now the tag is considered fully operational.
D. The Authentication Process of The Main Scheme
We assume R1, R2 2 Fl=22 . For simplicity reasons, we also
choose the following 2m = l (for m introduced in substring
functions). Subsequently, there are two main phases presented:
the tag authentication phase and the database authentication
phase. If the mutual authentication is not required the database
authentication phase can be skipped. Finally a tag identity
disclosure phase is optionally proposed for application-specific
purposes.
1) Tag Authentication to Database Phase: The protocol
messages for the tag authentication to the database are listed
in table II and described below. In figure 2, this phase
encompasses steps 1 and 2.
Table II
TAG AUTHENTICATION TO DATABASE.
1. R! T : Query||R1
2. T ! R : R2jjhkSID0jjAuthT
3. R! DB : R1jjR2jjhkSID0jjAuthT
4. DB ! R : OK/NOK
a) Message 1: The reader generates a random number, R1,
and it sends it with the Query. On receipt of this message,
the tag generates a random number, R2, and computes SM ,
a session mask with SessionMask(R1; R2;K). This mask
will be used to conceal the hkSID during exchanges and to
compute Auth, a mutual authentication ticket.
b) Message 2: In order to be authenticated by the database,
the tag computes hkSID0 and Auth respectively with
Mask(hkSID; SM) and AuthT icket(SID; SM). Since
Auth is a mutual authentication ticket, only the AuthT ,
defined here as Left(Auth) is sent along with R2, hkSID0.
c) Message 3: The reader receives message and forward
these values to database along with the previous random
number, R1. On receipt of this message, the database com-
putes SM with SessionMask(R1; R2;K) and hkSID with
UnMask(hkSID0; SM). Then it verifies that the hkSID is
a valid key in the hash table and extracts the related SID. To
authenticate the tag, it computes its own authentication ticket
Auth = AuthT icket(SID; SM) and compares its left part,
i.e. Left(Auth), with AuthT .
d) Message 4: If the hkSID was not a valid key or if
Left(Auth) is different of AuthT , the database sends NOK to
the reader and then the authentication of tag has failed. Else, it
sends OK to the reader to indicate a successful authentication.
At this stage, the tag authentication has been performed
and if a mutual authentication is not needed, the next phase
can be skipped. Our protocol suite being flexible, the optional
deliberate disclosure phase presented below can be achieved if
SID must be revealed to the reader for a specific application-
purpose.
Note that our protocol suite is flexible since if SID must be
revealed to the reader for application-purpose, the deliberate
disclosure phase can be achieved even when next phase have
been skipped.
2) Database Authentication to Tag Phase: Protocol mes-
sages for the subsequent database authentication to tag are
listed in table III and described as below. It only occurs if a
tag authentication phase was successful. In figure 2, this phase
is related to step 3.
Table III
DATABASE AUTHENTICATION TO TAG.
1. D ! R : AuthDB
2. R! T : AuthDB
3. T ! R : OK/NOK
a) Message 1: The database computes AuthDB =
Right(Auth) and sends it to the reader.
b) Message 2: The reader receives the message and forwards
it to the tag. On receipt of this message, the tag compares
AuthDB with Right(Auth).
c) Message 3: If Right(Auth) is different of AuthDB , the
tag sends NOK to the reader and then the authentication of
database has failed; else, it sends OK to the reader to inform
it of a successful authentication.
3) Optional Deliberate Disclosure of SID to Reader Phase:
The protocol messages for the subsequent optional disclosure
of tag’s SID to reader are listed in table IV and described as
below. It only occurs if, at least, a tag authentication phase
was successful. In figure 2, this phase encompasses step 4.
Table IV
DELIBERATE DISCLOSURE OF SID TO READER.
1. R! DB : OK
2. DB ! R : SID
a) Message 1: The reader informs database that tag has
authenticated it and it needs the SID by sending OK.
b) Message 2: The database provides it the requested SID
of the tag.
E. Our Set of Protocols
In this section, three protocols are described. They have
the same security requirements and the same communication
costs. They differ on the computational cost, storage cost as
Database
K = kl−1 · · · k0
Reader Tag
K = kl−1 · · · k0
Gen. random R1 Gen. random R2Query || R1
SM = SessionMask(R1, R2,K)
hkSID′ =Mask(hkSID, SM)
Auth = AuthT icket(SID, SM)
AuthT = Left(Auth)
R2||hkSID′||AuthT
Step1
R1||R2||hkSID′||AuthT
SM = SessionMask(R1, R2,K)
hkSID = UnMask(hkSID′, SM)
Get SID in Database with hkSID
Auth = AuthT icket(SID, SM)
Left(Auth)
?
= AuthT
OK/NOK
Step2
AuthDB = Right(Auth) AuthDB AuthDB
AuthDB
?
= Right(Auth)
OK/NOK
Step3
OK
SID
Step4
Figure 2. Main scheme of the proposed authentication protocols.
illustrated in sections VII-A and VII-B, and on the g function
used as illustrated below.
1) Protocol 1 using g1(X): In protocol 1, the g PRNG
function is g1(X) and other presented functions are defined
as follow:
 SessionMask(R1; R2;K) = g1((R1jjR2)K)
 Mask(hkSID; SM) = hkSID  SM
 AuthT icket(SID; SM) = g1(SID  SM)
 UnMask(hkSID0; SM) = hkSID0  SM .
2) Protocol 2 using g2(X;Y ): In protocol 2, the g PRNG
function is g2(X;Y ) and other presented functions are defined
as follow:
 SessionMask(R1; R2;K) = g2(R1jjR2;K)
 Mask(hkSID; SM) = hkSID  SM
 AuthT icket(SID; SM) = g2(SID; SM)
 UnMask(hkSID0; SM) = hkSID0  SM .
3) Protocol 3 using g3(X): In protocol 3, the g PRNG
function is g3(X) and other presented functions are defined
as follow:
 SessionMask(R1; R2;K) = g3((R1jjR2)K)
 Mask(hkSID; SM) = hkSID  Left(SM)
 AuthT icket(SID; SM) = SID Right(SM)
 UnMask(hkSID0; SM) = hkSID0  Left(SM).
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we verify that our protocols meet the security
properties identified section IV and that they are resistant to
the attacks and threats identified section III-A.
A. Properties
1) Untraceability: The property of untraceability could be
expressed through the following rule [16]: it is not possible to
determine if two traces of the protocol are related to the same
tag to to two different tags.
For our protocols, the exchanged variables R1; R2 are ran-
dom. The tag can be identified by SID or hkSID. However,
these values are never exchanged in plaintext. Since SM is
computed with the SessionMask, a function designed to
output values looking like random for an adversary, and this
value is used to mask hkSID, hkSID0 seems to be random.
Since the AuthT icket function is also designed to exploit the
randomness of SM to hide SID value in the Auth, the AuthT
also seems to be random. Thus no identity-related information
can derived from this value.
An adversary has a probability to identify twice a same tag
(if each tag in the database has the same probability, P , to be
used) of
P  (number of recorded sessions)
(2l  number of SIDs in database)
(where l=2 is the length of Ri) since the same R1 and R2
must occur in among the recorded sessions and should give
the same hkSID0 and AuthT .
However the probability, P , to differentiate among traces
(recorded sessions) that is not the same tag is
P  (number of recorded sessions)=2l
(if at least two traces with same R1; R2 contain different
hkSID0, from the above definition an attacker can determine
that this is not the same tag for each trace).
These probabilities are valid if the adversary only eaves-
drops the communications. Indeed if an active attacker is
involved in a subsequent transaction and at the same time
he has previously recorded sessions involving the tag, he will
attempt to identify the tag (through SID or hkSID) by using
a fake reader that will always use the same value for R1. To
identify hkSID, he must find a same hkSID0. However, as
the attacker cannot choose R2, SM looks like a random value
and it is very difficult to successfully identify hkSID. To
identify SID, he must find a same AuthT . However, since a
same AuthT does not implied to have a same Auth (AuthT
is only the left part of Auth; several couple (SID; SM) can
give the same left part when AuthT icket function is applied
to them), the probability, P , to identify another time a tag is:
P  (number of recorded sessions)=2l=2
where l=2 is the size of R2.
2) Mutual authentication: The server identifies the tag with
the hkSID key and gets the related SID in the hash table of
the database. Next the server authenticates tag by comparing
its computation Auth (Left substring) with AuthT , the tag
authentication ticket.
The tag authenticates the server by verifying the server
computation Auth (Right substring) with AuthDB , the tag
authentication ticket. Since only the server and the tag have
key K and SID as shared secrets, our protocols provide
mutual authentication.
It can be noticed that, after a successful mutual authentica-
tion, SID can be considered as a secret shared by the database
and the tag and it can thus be used for security operations (like
signing the subsequent exchanges if message authentication
and integrity are required).
B. Attacks Analysis
In this section we analyze the resistance of our protocols
against several attacks achieving threats presented in sec-
tion III.
1) Random Authentication Attack: For this attack, an op-
ponent can attempt a random authentication to impersonate
a tag. He sends random data from a fake tag and hopes
that it will be luckily authenticated by the database. In our
protocols, the database authenticates the tag if there is an SID
for hkSID and that use of this SID in computation leads
to Left(Auth) = AuthT . The probability of a successful
random authentication is that of the hkSID is valid multiply
by that of AuthT is valid. hkSID being valid if there is
a SID for it and AuthT being related to Auth which is
computed by the g PRNG function applied on SID and SM
(a random number-like), the probability, P , is:
P  (number of SIDs in database)=2l+l=2
(where l is the size of hkSID0 and l=2 is the size of AuthT ).
2) Replay Attack: Since an opponent can eavesdrop and
record the communications between the tag and the reader
to impersonate a tag, he can try to replay authentication
with recorded data answered by a tag. However as the value
provided by the reader is random, the probability to use the
recorded data another time is low.
For a passive attacker, the probability, P , to reuse data of
recorded sessions (with different R1) to successfully authen-
ticate a tag is:
P  (number of recorded sessions)=2l=2
(where l=2 is the size of R1) since for each R1 recorded, the
attacker has a true answer.
For an active attacker, like in the attack done by Tom
Van Deursen et al. [8, 9] on Chien et al.’s protocol [1], the
probability is the same as performing a random authentication
attack. Indeed an algebraic difference on R1 cannot be ex-
ploited since the g functions used in SessionMask functions
defined in our protocols are resistant to algebraic attacks (see
assumption A6).
3) Man-in-the-middle and Relay Attacks: By design, the
proposed protocols are protected against the man-in-the-
middle attack but not against relay attacks. To be protected
against this latter attack, our protocols, like those presented
in the related work section, should implement additional
countermeasures like distance-bounding protocols [17]–[19]
that try to detect the delay induced by the relay between the
leech and the ghost, tag localization [20], etc. However, the
performance penalties incurred due to these countermeasures
may not be suitable for low-cost tags.
4) DoS and Desynchronization Attacks: By design, the pro-
posed protocols being stateless, they are protected against DoS
and desynchronization attacks. Indeed, they do not establish
dependencies between each authentication. Each transaction
being considered as a new one, no synchronization is required
between the database and the tag. By design, since there is no
update in the tag side, it is impossible to put it in a dead-end
state.
For the security of the database common solutions (like
tracking queries of readers and blocking them in the the case
of malevolent behavior) could be used to avoid a reader to
overload the database query engine. However, the infrastruc-
ture between readers and database being assumed trusted (see
assumption A3), study of these solutions is out of the scope
of this paper.
5) Chosen Values Attack: This attack is based on the fact
that a protocol may be vulnerable to some specific values.
Thank to the use of g function and random numbers in the
computation of the session mask SM , there are no specific
values forbidden in our protocols.
6) Timing Attack: An attacker can perform a well-known
attack in world of smart card: the timing attack. The timing
attack is a side channel attack presented by Kocher [21] in
which the attacker attempts to compromise a cryptosystem
by analyzing the time taken to execute operations (like cryp-
tographic algorithms). Every logical operation in a tag takes
time to execute and the time can differ based on the input.
With precise measurements of the time for each operation, an
attacker can work backwards to the input. This attack is very
efficient when a secret is used as a loop bound.
This attack is not applicable on our protocols since the only
function likely to be attacked is g and it is assumed (see
assumption A6) being resistant against this attack (which is
realistic for candidates mentioned in section III-B). However,
this attack may be effective on some implementations of the
protocols [22, 23] presented in the related work section.
7) Database Impersonation Attack: The tag authenticates
the database if Right(Auth) = AuthDB . This equality
depends on the behaviour of g function whose outputs are
randoms. The probability, P , is that of AuthDB is valid, i.e.:
P  1=2l=2
(where l=2 is the size of AuthDB).
It is obvious that this attack cannot be considered as
practicable if l is long enough.
C. Physical Attacks
Even if we assumed (see assumption A4) that our tag
provides sufficient security against a key recovery from the
memory, some extensions can be added to increase the secu-
rity. Some groups of tags can be made and named Ti. Each
tag of the group can be personalized with the same key KTi
at the enrollment phase. Thus the tag has to store this group
identifier Ti which can be represented on n bits. During the
first step of the authentication, Ti can be sent in plaintext along
with the rest of the message in order that the database used
the related key, KTi for its computation.
Obviously to preserve the privacy, tags from different groups
should be given to user in a random way and n should be
kept smaller than l. The advantage of this solution is that an
attacker will not break the whole RFID system: if he succeeds
to extract key, KTi , in memory of a tag, only tags of the group
Ti will be compromised.
In addition, it may be possible to add this key update phase
in our protocol after a successful authentication based on
database decision (for instance database is aware that KTi of
the group Ti has been compromised and it wish to change
key). Note that updating key, means to change the tag of
group (which is not a problem, since tags have been given
in a random way to their owners) from Ti to Tj . Protocol
messages for a key update are listed in table V and described
as below.
Table V
KEY UPDATE FOR A TAG BELONGING TO A GROUP Ti AND MOVED IN Tj .
1. DB ! R : (KTj  SID)jjTj
2. R! T : (KTj  SID)jjTj
a) Message 1: After a successful authentication, the
database decides to change the key KTi of the tag belonging
to the group Ti to another group, lets say Tj . Tj can be a
new group and in this case on database side, the database has
to add it by generating a key KTj . In any case, Tj has just
been created or if Tj already existing, the database sent to the
reader (KTj  SID) and the new group identifier Tj .
b) Message 2: The reader forwards this message to the
tag. On receipt of this message, to avoid a desynchronization
attack, the tag first unmasks the key with its SID, puts it in
an additional memory space of length l bits and put the group
identifier Tj in an additional memory space of length n bits.
Then a flag should be set atomically1 to inform the tag that
it must now use the space containing Tj and KTj instead of
Ti and KTi . Spaces containing Ti and KTi will serve for a
future key update. The flag is just here to indicate which is
the current space to read it.
However, if this key update mechanism enforce the proto-
cols, it requires a bit more of l + n supplementary bits in
1An atomic update guarantee that either the new or the previous value will
be in the updated memory area at the end of update but not another value
– it is specially useful to protect update against error occuring during the
operation.
the tag memory. Contrary to other protocols being prone to
desynchronization attack, our solution should be more resistant
due to the atomical update mechanism that we explicitly
propose and that is only for 1 flag. Indeed, if the flag is not
updated due to a desynchronization attack, the tag is still able
to communicate with the database since it is still using the old
group identifier Ti and the old related key KTi .
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, the costs of our proposals are analyzed
to prove that they can be successfully implemented on low-
cost tags, which is a key point to attain a great market
penetration, since they minimize the computational, storage
and communication costs whilst being efficient and secure (as
shown in the previous section).
A. Computational Cost Analysis
The lightweight property is ensured since on tag’s side since
our protocols only require that tag uses a RNG to create
the challenge R2, a PRNG function, g, and few common
functions (XOR, Substring part). If we analyse each function
individually, a PRNG is lightweight (but not ultralightweight)
and the Left and Right functions are also lightweight since
they can be implemented with masked bitwise AND and
shift (for instance with X 2 F82, Right(X) and Left(X)
can be respectively computed with (X ^ 0x0F )[3::0] and
(X ^0xF0 4)[3::0], i.e. for each only the 4 least significant
bits are kept).
The total cost of our protocols on tag’s side depends of
the cost of the g function and the number of calls to it (it is
called twice for protocols using g1 and g2 and only once for
that using g3).
B. Storage Cost Analysis
The tag must permanently store: the tag’s identity, SID, the
key of SID in hash table of database, hkSID, and a shared
secret key, K, each of them of the length of l bits. To achieve
computations and temporary storage of R1, tag also handles
several variables of the length of l and l=2 bits.
Depending of the chosen proposed protocol we evaluate the
total memory consumption from 5l+ l=2 to 6l+ l=2 bits. We
should add to this value the memory consumption required by
the g function.
However for comparison purposes of our protocols to other
lightweight RFID protocols we only take into account the 3l
bits used in persistent memory like all authors did in their
papers [22, 24, 25].
C. Communication Cost Analysis
The communication cost is important since if the commu-
nication cost is heavy, the protocol is slow to execute and an
user must wait to have her authentication response.
The size of exchanged messages are:
 for reader-to-tag communication, the query of let say
40 bits, a challenge R1 of l=2-bits, an authentication
response AuthDB of l=2-bits, i.e. a total of 40 + l bits;
 for tag-to-reader communication, almost the same (R2
and AuthT ) but hkSID0 of l bits and the final response
(OK/NOK) of 1 bit must be added and the query must
be removed, i.e. a total of 1 + 2l bits.
D. Implementation Advices
To reduce the cost of the tags used in our protocols, the
RNG can be replaced by a PRNG which could be the g
function already used in implementation.
To improve performance on back-end, for a mutual authenti-
cation, a developer is advised to gather OK/NOK and AuthDB
in only one message between step 2 and step 3.
VIII. RELATED WORK
To compare our proposals with related work, we have
studied a number of lightweight authentication protocols and
for most of them, several attacks were possible, even some
which are, at the best of our knowledge, unpublished but that
we cannot expand here due to space constraints, like: a) an
algebraic attack is possible on [26], an “improved” version of
the protocol of Chien et al. [1] that inspired us; b) a random
authentication attack is possible on [27] which is a 2-factor
authentication also inspired by Chien et al. [1] but patched
against algebraic attack; c) a chosen value attack is possible
on Gossamer [25] if an attacker uses a defective or rogue
reader whose he can control the RNG, he can recover ID
and thus trace the tags; d) some desynchronization attacks
against [26, 28]; e) timing attack may be possible against
Chien et al. [22] and Peris et al. [25] that both use a secret data
as parameter of a “rotate” function whose implementation may
leak information on the secret data; f) Chien et al. [22] and
Peris et al. [25] are both susceptible by design to a collision
on the tag pseudonyms computed, even though probability of
collision is low if the size l is long enough; g) to be protected
against some desynchonization problems during update oper-
ation, Song et al. [24] and Chien et al. [22] must be atomic
which is expensive in term of memory and not mentioned
in the original paper – so this overhead has not been added
into table VI but we have considered them as being sensible
to desynchonization. Among all of them, we have only kept 3
from the family of lightweight mutual authentication protocols
presented by Song et al. [24], Chien et al. [22] and Peris et
al. [25] (Gossamer2) since communication or storage costs
were close of ours.
One of the key differences of our protocols is the use of
hkSID which is loaded on the tag at the enrollment step to
maintain the computational cost at the database side during
tag authentication at O(1). The only related work claiming to
be in O(1) is the last protocol of Chien et al. [22]. However,
any reader who will briefly analyse the protocol will see that
the claim is wrong and the protocol at database side is still in
O(n) like other papers.
2Contrary to Peris et al., in table VI, the Gossamer protocol is indicated
as ultralightweight to lightweight and not ultralightweight only like in [23]
because the MixBit function uses the add function which we consider
expensive compare to .
Last but not least, our protocols enable tags to have a
lifetime not limited by numbers of write in non volatile
memory (that store SID, khSID and K) since there is none
during authentication. Even though the feature to allow key
update is activated in our protocol, the number of writes
in EEPROM’s cells is significantly less than those of other
protocols where there is at least an update of a non volatile
memory’s cell (EEPROM, Flash or FRAM) at each authen-
tication run. The endurance of each cell of memory being
limited to 105 writing for EEPROM to 1012 for FRAM [29],
our protocol is more efficient for applications requiring very
frequent authentications (e.g. life of EEPROM is less than 1
month if authentication occurs every 30 seconds).
Note that some results in the table VI are different of those
presented in related papers since we take into account all
exchanged messages (like the Query, random sent by reader
and other information) to give a fair view.
Table VI
COMPARISON OF COSTS WITH OTHER PROTOCOLS.
Protocols
Song et al. [24] Chien et al. [22] Gossamer [23] Our Proposals
Communication R ! T (bits) 40 + 2l 40 + l + l=2 40 + 3l 40 + l
Communication T ! R (bits) 2l 1 + 2l + l=2 2l 1 + 2l
Total on RF interface (bits) 41 + 4l 41 + 4l 40 + 5l 41 + 3l
Memory size on Tag (bits) l 3l 7l 3l
Memory size on database (bits) 4l 5l 4l 2l
Computational cost on database O(n) O(n) O(n) O(1)
Classification of Lightweight Lightweight Ultralightweight Lightweight
computational cost on tag to Lightweight
Lifetime of tag 105 or 1012 105 or 1012 105 or 1012 1
in number of authentications
Table VII provides a comparison of the resistance of our
protocols and related work against aforementioned attacks.
Table VII
SECURITY COMPARISON WITH OTHER PROTOCOLS.
Protocols
Song et al. [24] Chien et al. [22] Gossamer [23] Our Proposals
Untraceability No [8, 9] Yes Yes Yes
Mutual authentication No* Yes Yes Yes
Algebraic Attack Resistant No [9] Yes Yes Yes
Desynch. & DoS Attacks Resistant No [8, 9, 30] No No [31, 32] N/A (Yes)
Database Entry Collision Resistant N/A (Yes) No No [33] N/A (Yes)
Chosen Value Attack Resistant 5 Yes ImpDep Yes
Timing Attack Resistant 5 ImpDep ImpDep N/A (Yes)
Random Authentication Attack Resistant 5 Yes Yes Yes
Database Impersonation Attack Resistant No [8, 9, 34] Yes Yes Yes
Man-in-the-middle Attack Resistant No [8, 9] Yes 5 Yes
Replay Attack Resistant No [8, 9] Yes No [33] Yes
5: Considered as irrelevant to resist to this attack since another attack exists with a higher probability of success
N/A: Not Applicable (thus the protocol is resistant) – No*: No since an attack exists – ImpDep: Implementation Dependent
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have shown that our protocols fulfill both
the functional and security requirements for low-cost tags. Our
proposals are practicable with the real world’s constraints since
the computational cost at database side being O(1) against
O(n) for the related work, transaction time is improved.
In addition, our protocols are flexible and can be modified
according to different goals:
 for tag authentication to the database, only steps 1 and
2 are sufficient. Indeed some applications do not require
mutual authentication (for instance, in stock management,
database just needs to know that a tag has been read and
then it could carry some internal operations like removal
from the current stock).
 for a mutual authentication between tag and database
without revealing information about tag to reader, steps
1, 2 and 3 are needed.
 for the disclosure of the tag’s identity to the reader, step
4 can be added. The disclosure of this identity could be
made according to a predefined policy: a) by the database
which reveals the SID to the reader, or b) by the tag (with
the OK/NOK message) which reveals itself its SID.
Finally, the protocol suite presented in this paper is flexible
and more secure and efficient than related work whilst ensuring
privacy-protection.
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